Water Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 74

1-1-2004

United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 79
P.3d 945 (Utah 2003)
Jessica L. Grether

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Jessica L. Grether, Court Report, United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 79 P.3d 945
(Utah 2003), 7 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 536 (2004).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Volume 7

WATER LAW REVIEW

the phrase 'southeast of Little Valley' was a misleading description of
the diversion points, and (3) the notice should have listed Leucadia as
the applicant, instead of Bloomington. The Utah Supreme Court
addressed these claims in turn.
Examining Prisbrey's first claim, the court found that the Engineer
followed Utah law in describing the proposed diversion points. The
court noted that the law required published applications to include
the applicant's name; a description of the water right; the quantity of
water used; the stream or source; the current and proposed points of
diversion; the places, purposes, and extent of present and proposed
use; and any other information the engineer needs. The court held
the Engineer had satisfied all requirements and that Prisbrey's claim
focused merely on the nomenclature used to describe the diversion
points. According to the court, the Engineer used customary language
that complied with elementary rules of punctuation. Thus, "as long as
the published notices fully and accurately disclose the statutorily
required information," the publication's form is within the Engineer's
discretion. The court also stated that there is a presumption that
members of the "water-right holding community" understand the
Engineer's nomenclature.
The court held Prisbrey's second claim failed because the
Engineer did not intend "Little Valley" to be a specific description
because he had already given specific locations of the diversions in
legal detail. The court concluded that the phrase simply enabled
interested readers to quickly find the water notices they needed to
read. Further, the court stated that Prisbrey had again challenged the
form of the term and had failed to provide statutory support for his
claim.
Regarding Prisbrey's last claim, the court held that based on prior
rulings, only a water right owner was entitled to change a water right.
Thus, as the water right owner, Bloomington was the proper party to
apply for a diversion point change. Leucadia, as lessee, held only a
terminable possessory interest in rights and a future right to purchase
the water right; it would be illogical to allow Leucadia to make
permanent changes in the diversion point.
Because Prisbrey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by
filing a timely protest and because the Engineer's published notice
complied with all statutory requirements, the court upheld the trial
court's grant of summaryjudgment in Bloomington's favor.
Jeff Giliio

United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 79 P.3d
945 (Utah 2003) (holding trial court should abstain from hearing
private suits for relief inconsistent with an uncontested proposed
determination by the state engineer).
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Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC"), a mutual water
company. As a result, HCIC acquired the Cleveland Canal, which runs
from the mouth Huntington Creek to the town of Cleveland, Utah,
crossing Cedar Creek, a tributary of Huntington Creek. Due to Cedar
Creek's heavy spring run-off flows that would wash out the canals,
HCIC built a cement "flood bridge" across the Cleveland Canal to
allow up to ten cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water to flow into the
canal. As part of the State Engineer's general adjudication of the San
Rafael River, HCIC claimed a right to 10 cfs from Cedar Creek in 1970.
Though United States Fuel Company ("U.S. Fuel") diverted water
from Cedar Creek as well, it did not protest HCIC's claim. On
December 1, 1982, the State Engineer issued a proposed
determination recognizing HCIC's senior irrigation right on Cedar
Creek.
On December 2, a U.S. Fuel agent received the State
Engineer's determination, but did not file an objection until ninetyone days later. In 1989, HCIC demanded U.S. Fuel release the first ten
cfs in Cedar Creek for HCIC's use. In 1992, U.S. Fuel, ANR Co., Inc.,
and intervenor Intermountain Power Agency and their predecessor-ininterest (collectively "USF") brought this action before the Emery
County District Court to quiet title to its water rights and prevent
HCIC from interfering with its use. In a counterclaim, HCIC asserted
it possessed a senior water right and requested the trial court find USF
abandoned its rights.
On September 10, 2001, the trial court
disregarded the State Engineer's previous determination and held
USF had a priority water right to the Cedar Creek. HCIC appealed
directly to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing (1) the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this dispute; (2) neither waiver, estoppel nor laches
barred USF's claim to a senior priority right; (3) estoppel barred HCIC
from submitting evidence of Cedar Creek's tributaries; and (4) USF
had not forfeited its water rights.
On appeal, HCIC argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
this matter because permitting USF to challenge the determination
through an independent action outside of the pending general
adjudication violated Utah Code section 73-4-11. Section 73-4-11
requires a claimant to object to the State Engineer's proposed
determination of water rights by filing an objection within ninety days
of the date of service. If the claimant fails to do so, section 73-4-12
requires the court to render a judgment in accordance with the
proposed determination. USF argued the requirements in section 734-11 were only permissive, not mandatory.
After noting the State Engineer's special qualifications for
understanding water disputes, the court conceded the State Engineer
was an executive officer that could not serve a judicial function;
therefore, generally, the proposed determinations were persuasive
only and could not bar private claims over water rights. However, the
court found the plain language of section 73-4-12 created an exception
to the general rule by mandating courts to render judgments
consistent with uncontested determinations. Furthermore, the court
reiterated, "the adoption of uncontested state engineer's proposed
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determinations by operation of law did not unconstitutionally confer
adjudicative power on the state engineer." Acknowledging USF's
ability to seek leave of court to excuse its untimely objection, the court
concluded that until USF explored that remedy, HCIC was entitled to
the ten cfs water right reflected in the State Engineer's proposed
award.
Thus, because USF did not object to the proposed determination
within ninety days, the trial court lacked authority to hear an action
that could result in a judgment inconsistent with an uncontested
determination.
Therefore, the court held the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this claim and vacated the judgment.
Jessica L. Grether

Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125
(Utah 2003) (holding that Utah Water Conservancy Act did not create
standing for a water conservancy district to bring cause of action for
forfeiture; and party protesting a change application does not gain
standing, by virtue of the protest, to petition the court for a
declaration of forfeiture).
The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints ("CPB") submitted a change application to
the State Engineer for certain water rights located in Washington
County, Utah. The Washington County Water Conservancy District
("Conservancy District") submitted a challenge to the change
application, asserting that CPB forfeited some of its water rights. The
State Engineer granted CPB's request, noting that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine whether CPB forfeited its water rights. The
Conservancy District then petitioned the Washington County District
Court challenging the State Engineer's determination of the change
application, and charged that CPB had forfeited the water rights at
issue. The trial court ruled that the Conservancy District lacked
standing to bring its cause of action and the Conservancy District
appealed directly to the Utah Supreme Court.
On appeal, the court considered three issues: (1) whether the
Utah Water Conservancy Act ("Act") granted standing to the
Conservancy District, (2) whether the Conservancy District's
participation in the change application proceedings gave standing to
challenge the state engineer's determination, and (3) whether the
Conservancy District qualified for standing under traditional standing
requirements.
First, in addressing standing under the Act, the court concluded
that the Act did not grant the Conservancy District standing. The
court reached this conclusion by noting that the Act contained broad
statements outlining the purposes of conservancy districts. Subsequent
to these broad statements were specific powers that the legislature

